# re: Six approaches to fragile states @ Monday, January 16, 2006 1:01 PM

My own view is that real political change can only come, and be sustained by holding governments to account. Thus, when I look at your box of six possible interventions, I look for ways in which civil society (however defined) can push and prod the state and hold it accountable.

Now, it is one of the characteristics of a fragile state that people are relatively powerless and voiceless, so it is particularly difficult to find entry points. Further, since (I believe) civil society must do this job themselves – empowerment cannot be given to a people, they must grab it for themselves! – donors’ roles are limited. That said, donors should do what they can to bolster civil society in its struggle against a non-developmental and/or destructive regime.

First, the donors should make sure that their own national companies stop selling arms to fragile or poorly performing states. I would always start a discussion with government representatives by stating that UK, US, French etc. arms manufacturers fuel the conflicts and wars that they (or their aid agencies) want to halt. So, start there! (Similarly, conflict diamonds, hardwoods etc).

With respect to your matrix:

Dialogue – the problem has been inconsistency. For instance, in Zimbabwe, some donors talk to government while others do not Also, the UN seems not to have a clear strategy, planning to send representatives, then not sending them. Ditto for AU. Commonwealth is divided too. A clear, single voice should be heard.

Another problem is that aid is now arriving in fragile states from governments with few scruples – mostly non-traditional aid donors. These governments have different interests – unrelated to human rights, good governance, even local security – and when fragile states no longer want to listen to the West, they head off to non-traditional donors for help. So, the Western donor community also needs to discover how to leverage good behaviour out of these alternative donors. What drives them, what incentives can be used to bring them in line, how to get their civil societies involved?

The African Union and NEPAD Peer Review Mechanism are still weak, especially with regard to governance (and military involvement in conflict situations). But before the AU can be motivated, the people of Africa need to be informed about what is really going on, and demand reform of their own governments!

Bypass government – Remember the piece I noted a few weeks ago, in Foreign Affairs, about strategies for giving aid that directly challenge repressive regimes. It said, if you recall, for donors to give aid in ways that increase the capacity of local people to come together, organise, and communicate. So, giving aid via NGOs must do this explicitly if we want a political outcome. Otherwise, we are just doing the work of the government – maybe even increasing their credibility – by providing education, health, etc.

Giving humanitarian assistance will work, as long as it does not help keep a repressive regime in power. I was pleased to see, for instance, that in Zimbabwe WFP would not allow chiefs/party officials to determine who was to receive food aid, but held to its global requirement that aid be distributed according to lists created by community leaders elected by aid recipients. But this is not always the case, and humanitarian aid can easily be used by governments to strengthen their hold (e.g., Mengistu, Pol Pot, Taliban et al).

It is ultimately dangerous to bypass government because as Fukuyama states, what we want are strong states with limited scope, not weak ones. Donors should be aware of that, and not go overboard in bypassing states.

Involvement of parliaments – often left out – in governance programme design and implementation is central, as their members are often part of presidential/patronage networks, and have little understanding of the broader issues involved in creating a developmental state. Also, parliaments are also weak due to having few resources.

Incentivize government – These instruments and examples you list will help in states that are still semi-legitimate and attempting to interact with the international community, but would not really (I suppose) concern some leaders. The only incentives that would interest them would be illegitimate ones, like helping pay fuel or electricity bills.

The Millennium Challenge Corporation is not about helping fragile states, but those that are nearing good performance, I believe… if you look at their selection conditionalities. I doubt its requirements would be of interest to governments of near-basket-case states.

Conditionality, such as sanctions against SA, only worked because we had both insiders campaigning and outsiders pushing. Again, this means mobilizing local society against repressive government and getting all outsiders working together. Again, getting non-traditional donors onside would help (as they provide these governments with legitimacy – e.g., invitations to international meetings and goods, such as fuel, etc).

State Capacity building – Research has shown these technical fixes – financial management, institution building, etc – have little impact if the ‘political will’ to reform is missing. So, this is a non-starter unless you ‘get the politics right’. This is related to 'ownership' -- and that is characteristically missing in a fragile state (no particular interest in reform). Nonetheless, key reforms – e.g., rule of law institution building, liberalising the state media – should be pursued, but with realistic expectations.

Non-state capacity – see above re. by-passing government. Here I think some good work can be done. The key, to me, is helping to organise mass civil society as a political force, and this means information-sharing. Media are central, so work with the media (as Dfid and USAID did in 1993 in Malawi, buying them computers and setting up a media centre). Getting TI to start chapters is also good, though these have to link to local anti-corruption efforts. Citizen score cards are good for sector programmes and projects, as they reinforce rights-based development.

Support to all governance institutions (HR commission, Ombudsmen, Anti-corruption commission, Truth Commission – an important body that can play a vital role but is often ignored by donors - Law Commission, etc). Writing curricula for schools that include governance and HR information, etc. … anything that spreads information about politics and rights. Then you have to build capacity (time consuming and difficult, without just creating an NGO elite).

Donors should invite civil society to participate at various levels, in all major government-donor meetings (e.g., CG, PRSP etc) relating to economic policy formulation and evaluation, corruption, governance, etc. Governments often try to keep civil society actors out of policy planning, which weakens accountability of government to the people and mistakenly makes governments accountable instead to donors!

The problem with such a programme is, of course, that it might spark confrontation and conflict, but that is the result of civil society empowerment and the rising desire of people to make their government accountable. Donors must weigh the possibilities of conflict/violence against repressive and unstable regimes and consider their alternatives over the longer term.

Military deployment – Only as a last resort. I doubt they have much of a development or democratisation role to play (though security is essential to both), though efforts should be made to train them up in these areas… but in a positive way, not ‘how to capture hearts and minds’ (e.g., 1980s Central America and 2005 Iraq).

Your matrix covers all bases as far as I can see, but needs substantial development and a ‘incomplete, use with caution’ label until filled in.

Diana Cammack

# re: Six approaches to fragile states @ Friday, January 27, 2006 9:52 AM

Diana Cammack is right about political accountability and the need for local actors to take the lead. I am not sure how much farther your matrix takes us. (I was a bit surprised to see no mention of explicitly political interventions such as support for elections, which are a favourite of donors, albeit likely to be ineffective unless the local situation is right.) I very much agree about the importance of good local understanding.

The key problems for development assistance practitioners are: -
• Judging when states are so “fragile” that conventional development assistance is unlikely to do much good or, putting it the other way, when governance is “good enough” for aid to make a difference. We deal with a spectrum of governance cases from those where it is obvious that humanitarian assistance and perhaps military intervention are the only ways forward to those where budget support and capacity-building for the state makes good sense. Practitioners tend to be incorrigibly optimistic. The NEPAD peer review process and further discussion of governance indicators might be a way forward;
• Finding ways that donors can intervene which encourage progress in local politics. Local elites are good at using external resources for their own purposes so it is important to “do no harm”. But we seem to lack a good evidence base for the way that external interventions can work e.g. by opening up political space and promoting domestic accountability, by encouraging transparency and broadening access to resources and markets. Good local understanding is key.
Brian Thomson

Brian Thomson