On 18 July, ODI and the World Bank organised a joint seminar to discuss the current state of knowledge on General Budget Support (GBS) as an aid modality, bringing together a small audience of researchers, practitioners, policy makers and civil society organisations, and with John Burton (DFID) as the chair. One of the reasons for holding the seminar was the recent publication of two related pieces of work: the Joint Evaluation of GBS promoted by a consortium of donors in seven countries (Burkina Faso, Malawi, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Rwanda, Uganda, Vietnam), and a book edited by the World Bank on ‘Budget Support as More Effective Aid?’.
The two presenters, Stephen Lister (team leader for the Joint Evaluation) and Stefan Koeberle (co-editor of the World Bank volume) highlighted a number of achievements and some challenges related of the introduction of GBS as an aid modality in various countries.
Among the achievements were:
The provision of efficient, effective and sustainable support to national poverty reduction strategies;
Positive systemic effects on government capacity;
An expansion of public services;
The mainstreaming of an approach to aid which strengthens government ownership and promotes better alignment with national strategies;
An improved understanding of the importance and functioning of public financial management systems, and of the necessary measures to mitigate fiduciary risks associated with GBS.
The main challenges they identified were:
Limited progress on wider harmonisation issues and on the reduction of transaction costs;
Lack of predictability of GBS funding, especially regarding securing and delivering on long-term commitments;
The difficult balance between government autonomy and donor intrusion when defining conditionality frameworks, as intense policy dialogue and performance assessment frameworks associated with GBS can undermine domestic accountability and limit policy space.
The discussants (Atish Ghosh of the IMF and Andrew Lawson of ODI) added some further food for thought. They highlighted the uncertainty that political conditionalities unrelated to economic performance can create for budgeting processes, as well as the potential macroeconomic impact of scaling up GBS to meet the MDGs. They also stressed the importance of bringing stand-alone projects within national budget systems as a way of strengthening them, and of ensuring better predictability, given that improvements in government performance are more likely to stem from the assurance of continued support than from threats of its interruption or withdrawal, which may also have severe adverse macroeconomic consequences. Finally, they saw as issues for further consideration the harmonisation of donor conditionality frameworks (i.e. the relationship between conditions for sectoral and general budget support) without leaving a large portion of the recurrent budget vulnerable to abrupt and disruptive interruption of support.
The discussion focused on the significance of the evaluation results and on the future of GBS as an aid modality. Some participants noted that there is a risk of overloading the ‘GBS issue’ in aid debates, given that at the moment GBS only represents 5% of total ODA (even though, another participant noted that, in the countries assessed, GBS can represent more than 20% of total aid flows). Despite its overall positive results, GBS assessments are mostly pointing towards possible improvements in GBS interventions, rather than proving the validity of the underlying theory which states that a shift towards GBS can strengthen national institutions, policy processes and accountability mechanisms. As a matter of fact, evidence on improved domestic accountability is at best scanty. Donors still have a tendency to focus too much on getting the most value out of aid funds in the short-term, rather than promoting long-term virtuous cycles of institutional development and poverty reduction.
This is partly due to the difficulties that donor agencies face in understanding and supporting such processes, sometimes due to internal constraints and incentives, but also to the fact that GBS is but one of a number of aid instruments utilised by donors. Sometimes its positive effects can be counter-balanced by the use of other more fragmented instruments, not fully realising potential complementarities. While it could be argued that in theory only a decisive shift towards GBS as the main aid delivery modality could maximise its positive effects, in practice all donors have to adopt a risk minimisation strategy using a range of instruments, let alone the fact that some donors are still heavily sceptical about GBS.
What this implies is the need to look at the total aid portfolio, including GBS, sector and project support, and technical assistance in order to ensure that overall aid effectiveness, not only in terms of poverty outcomes, but also of institutional strengthening and domestic accountability, is maximised, taking into account the complementarities and contradictions that exist across aid instruments. It also means that the discussion on how to improve the design of GBS instruments (on predictability, harmonisation, political risk) need to continue, along with thinking about other instruments, possibly more suited to genuine long-term support for country strategies.
Before the end of the seminar the chair (John Burton of DFID) asked all panelists to put forward some key points for the future of GBS. Some of the ideas that were put forward were:
A better integration of the core diagnostics that are increasingly utilised for determining the appropriateness of GBS in different countries (e.g. PEFA, governance assessments, etc.);
More pragmatism in finding appropriate solutions to each context (e.g. GBS in Sierra Leone will look very different from GBS in Tanzania);
An increasing shift towards ex-post conditionality, so that aid is used to finance reforms, rather than to buy them;
A better strategy to ‘sell’ GBS to domestic audiences in donor countries, explaining its advantages and finding creative ways to report on actual performance;
A move from GBS as a modality to a more comprehensive look at aid portfolios in their totality, understanding and building on the complementarities amongst different aid instruments.
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re: General Budget Support: What Next? @ Wednesday, August 02, 2006 1:03 PM
There appears to be a danger inherent in GBS that it will undermine decentralisation and therefore the delivery of services by local government. Although some countries have an entrenched system of decentralising the national fiscus - Ghana and Uganda being two examples - not many do. Yet, the services required to meet nearly all of the MDGs lie in whole or in part with local government. Has anyone looked at the centralising tendency of GBS?
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re: General Budget Support: What Next? @ Tuesday, September 05, 2006 10:47 AM
The new aid architecture that evolved in the late 1990s and early 21st century was intended to promote new legitimacy and space in developing countries for poor people and the civil society organisations working with them to both engage with, and influence, the policy process. As stated above, the underlying assumption is that by focusing on government’s own accountability mechanisms, general budget support will improve transparency and accountability to the country’s parliamentary institutions and electorate. Accordingly, the GBS evaluation framework produced by ODI and DFID in 2001 and endorsed by the OECD in 2003, includes ‘enhanced democratic accountability’ as one of five ‘outputs’ of GBS. But the framework recognises that enhanced democratic accountability is not an automatic consequence of GBS but is likely to be enhanced only if domestic organisations actively demand greater accountability from their governments, and in this respect NGOs and other CSOs can play a key role. A recent ActionAid and CARE report 'Where to Now? Implications of changing relations between DFID, recipient governments and NGOs in Malawi, Tanzania and Uganda' charts changes in the aid environment and their impact on local and international NGOs. It includes a discussion on changes to donors’ engagement with CSOs and questions how important the issue of democratic accountability is for donors, compared to other elements of the GBS modality, when there is evidence that donor-government dialogue over GBS is becoming more closed and CSOs are finding it increasingly difficult to have any kind of policy dialogue with donors in the current environment (with the possible exception of INGOs headquartered in the donor country). The closed nature of the donor-government dialogue over GBS is a manifestation of the more intense and exclusive relations that are now perceived to exist between the two groups. One key factor behind this trend appears to be donor harmonisation – a trend closely associated with general budget support but not unique to it. Although welcome in efficiency and effectiveness terms, donor harmonisation appears to have concentrated the overall power and influence of donors at a country level, thereby crowding out other stakeholders, including CSOs. Donors’ growing priority of engaging with governments and supporting national PRSPs means that donors see less reason to engage directly with CSOs as they are already participating in PRSP processes. In our opinion, this approach does not take account of the serious deficiencies in the participatory processes linked to PRSPs or the difficulties CSOs face in trying to influence fledgling democratic regimes not used to responding to demands from below. It ignores the fact that donors still have more sway with governments than CSOs and that GBS has actually increased governments’ upward accountability to donors, as other studies, including the Joint Evaluation, have shown. In the interests of downward accountability, the report recommends the establishment of tripartite forums between government, donors and CSOs to share information and discuss the aid relationship (eg underlying principles, funding levels and allocations, disbursement triggers and conditions etc). Furthermore, the report argues that it is essential that donors assess the impact of their use of GBS on domestic accountability, in recognition of its importance to the effectiveness of the aid provided. The full report can be found at the following websites: http://www.careinternational.org.uk/Where+to+now+Implications+of+Changing+Relations+between+DFID%2C+Recipient+Governments+and+NGOs+in+Malawi%2C+Tanzania+and+Uganda+7240.twl http://www.actionaid.org/index.asp?page_id=1236
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# re: General Budget Support: What Next? @ Wednesday, August 02, 2006 1:03 PM
There appears to be a danger inherent in GBS that it will undermine decentralisation and therefore the delivery of services by local government. Although some countries have an entrenched system of decentralising the national fiscus - Ghana and Uganda being two examples - not many do. Yet, the services required to meet nearly all of the MDGs lie in whole or in part with local government. Has anyone looked at the centralising tendency of GBS?Randal Smith
# re: General Budget Support: What Next? @ Tuesday, September 05, 2006 10:47 AM
The new aid architecture that evolved in the late 1990s and early 21st century was intended to promote new legitimacy and space in developing countries for poor people and the civil society organisations working with them to both engage with, and influence, the policy process. As stated above, the underlying assumption is that by focusing on government’s own accountability mechanisms, general budget support will improve transparency and accountability to the country’s parliamentary institutions and electorate. Accordingly, the GBS evaluation framework produced by ODI and DFID in 2001 and endorsed by the OECD in 2003, includes ‘enhanced democratic accountability’ as one of five ‘outputs’ of GBS. But the framework recognises that enhanced democratic accountability is not an automatic consequence of GBS but is likely to be enhanced only if domestic organisations actively demand greater accountability from their governments, and in this respect NGOs and other CSOs can play a key role. A recent ActionAid and CARE report 'Where to Now? Implications of changing relations between DFID, recipient governments and NGOs in Malawi, Tanzania and Uganda' charts changes in the aid environment and their impact on local and international NGOs. It includes a discussion on changes to donors’ engagement with CSOs and questions how important the issue of democratic accountability is for donors, compared to other elements of the GBS modality, when there is evidence that donor-government dialogue over GBS is becoming more closed and CSOs are finding it increasingly difficult to have any kind of policy dialogue with donors in the current environment (with the possible exception of INGOs headquartered in the donor country). The closed nature of the donor-government dialogue over GBS is a manifestation of the more intense and exclusive relations that are now perceived to exist between the two groups. One key factor behind this trend appears to be donor harmonisation – a trend closely associated with general budget support but not unique to it. Although welcome in efficiency and effectiveness terms, donor harmonisation appears to have concentrated the overall power and influence of donors at a country level, thereby crowding out other stakeholders, including CSOs. Donors’ growing priority of engaging with governments and supporting national PRSPs means that donors see less reason to engage directly with CSOs as they are already participating in PRSP processes. In our opinion, this approach does not take account of the serious deficiencies in the participatory processes linked to PRSPs or the difficulties CSOs face in trying to influence fledgling democratic regimes not used to responding to demands from below. It ignores the fact that donors still have more sway with governments than CSOs and that GBS has actually increased governments’ upward accountability to donors, as other studies, including the Joint Evaluation, have shown. In the interests of downward accountability, the report recommends the establishment of tripartite forums between government, donors and CSOs to share information and discuss the aid relationship (eg underlying principles, funding levels and allocations, disbursement triggers and conditions etc). Furthermore, the report argues that it is essential that donors assess the impact of their use of GBS on domestic accountability, in recognition of its importance to the effectiveness of the aid provided. The full report can be found at the following websites:http://www.careinternational.org.uk/Where+to+now+Implications+of+Changing+Relations+between+DFID%2C+Recipient+Governments+and+NGOs+in+Malawi%2C+Tanzania+and+Uganda+7240.twl
http://www.actionaid.org/index.asp?page_id=1236
Zaza Curran, Civil Society Advisor, CARE International UK